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MacDonald’s (2013) production-
distribution-comprehension (PDC)
account provides a valuable unification of
three aspects of language use. It identifies
some of the principles involved in pro-
duction and shows how they affect both
distributions of linguistic forms and the
process of comprehension. Our commen-
tary presents a complementary perspective
on the relationship between production
and comprehension.
On the basis of extensive evidence,
the PDC account proposes that speak-
ers tend to utter easy-to-produce words
early, reuse recently used structures, and
avoid producing utterances in which ele-
ments interfere with each other. These
principles produce distributions of utter-
ances, and comprehenders develop pro-
cessing mechanisms that are sensitive to
these distributions. Thus, they find it eas-
ier to interpret utterances that accord with
these principles than utterances that do
not accord with them, and use these prin-
ciples to guide ambiguity resolution. In
other words, comprehenders are funda-
mentally affected by their experience of
language and hence by its statistics.
The relationship between production
and comprehension is mediated by dis-
tribution. There is no direct (“on-line”)
effect of production on comprehension.
This contrasts with our integrated account
of production and comprehension, in
which people use production processes
to guide comprehension (and in fact use
comprehension processes to guide pro-
duction). Pickering and Garrod (in press)
argued that production and comprehen-
sion are not isolated from each other,
but that instances of comprehension can
involve production processes, rather than
“feedback” within the comprehension sys-
tem (and that instances of production
can involve comprehension processes).
We now propose that this interweaving in
fact provides the basis for the relationships
between production and comprehension
identified by MacDonald.
Pickering and Garrod (in press) argued
that addressees construct predictions of
what they are about to hear before they
hear it (see also Pickering and Garrod,
2007). Such predictions make use of for-
ward models, as assumed in many accounts
of action and action perception (see
Wolpert, 1997). For example, if I decide
to move my hand to a particular location,
I combine my intention, my hand’s posi-
tion in relation to the environment, and
my experience of the outcome of previous
similar intentions to construct a represen-
tation of (the percept of) my predicted
hand movement. For example, I might
predict that a particular intention will
cause my hand to move 500mm from my
body and 30◦ left of my midline, in 300ms
time. Importantly, the forward model out-
put (i.e., prediction) will be ready in (say)
100ms, before the movement. In fact, I
need to construct this model in order to
learn to control the movement fluently
(Wolpert et al., 2001). I can then compare
the prediction with the actual movement
when it occurs.
When I see you starting to move
your hand, I construct a prediction of
where your hand will end up, again
before you move your hand, and then
compare this with your actual move-
ment. Pickering and Garrod (in press)
proposed that perceivers can do this by
determining what they would do if it
were their hand (using “prediction-by-
simulation”). In other words, I covertly
imitate your movements to determine
the intention behind your movement and
use that intention to predict (my percept
of) your movement. The mapping from
intention to prediction involves the same
forward model as when I move my own
hand, which constitutes part of the action
system.
Pickering and Garrod (in press) noted
that language comprehension is a form
of action perception. They therefore pro-
posed that comprehenders covertly imitate
what they hear to determine the pro-
duction command (roughly, the speaker’s
intended message), and then use that
command to predict (their percept of)
the unfolding utterance. This mapping
involves a forward model that forms part
of the production system. Importantly,
comprehenders can predict linguistic rep-
resentations concerned with meaning,
grammar, or sound. For example, the com-
prehender hears the start of the speaker’s
utterance and uses covert imitation to pre-
dict aspects of the upcoming utterance,
for example that the upcoming word will
refer to something edible (Altmann and
Kamide, 1999) or will begin with a vowel
(DeLong et al., 2005).
One consequence of this framework
is that ease of comprehension is affected
by ease of production. For example, peo-
ple utter easy-to-produce words early, so
they predict that they will do so. They
therefore also predict that their interlocu-
tor will utter easy-to-produce words early.
Similarly, MacDonald (2013) pointed out
that this easy-first principle discourages
production of utterances such as John
will say that his cousins left tomorrow
(as tomorrow is short), and hence that
such utterances are rare. We argue that
comprehenders hear the sentence up to
left, and then use their production sys-
tem to predict that their interlocutor
will produce a local modifier. This pre-
diction involves the rapid construction
of a forward production model, which
therefore tends to be ready before the
speaker utters tomorrow. At this point, the
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comprehender can compare the predicted
and actual utterance percepts (using what
we term other-monitoring). In this case,
the important component of the predic-
tion is likely to be syntactic (relating to
the constituent structure of local modi-
fication) and semantic (relating to prior
temporal modification).
Our framework applies similarly to
plan reuse and reduce interference. People
tend to repeat syntactic structure, so they
predict that they will do so, and so they
also predict that their interlocutor will
do so. Finally, people disfavor utterances
involving proximate interfering words, so
they predict they will not produce such
utterances, and so they also predict that
their interlocutor will not do so either.
If they hear a sentence with a different
syntactic structure or interfering words in
close succession, they will tend to experi-
ence more difficulty than otherwise; and if
an utterance is ambiguous, they will tend
to assume that it involved syntactic repeti-
tion or that it did not involve interference.
Importantly, prediction-by-simulation
involves determining the speaker’s inten-
tion, and this involves combining the
speaker’s utterance so far with the non-
linguistic context. Just as I use my knowl-
edge about our relationship to predict
whether your arm movement is prelude
to a handshake or a punch, so I use non-
linguistic context to determine whether
you are likely to complete I’m thirsty, could
you get me a. . . with coffee or beer. We
propose that people can use another route
to prediction (prediction-by-association),
based on usage statistics, and which is
no different for complex non-linguistic
experiences that need not involve action
perception (e.g., perception of inanimate
objects). It appears that PDC makes
use of such statistics, though it makes
no claim about prediction. We argue
that prediction-by-simulation is much
more versatile because it incorporates
non-linguistic context to derive intentions.
For example, it can straightforwardly
explain the immediate detection of the
anomaly of a man’s voice saying “I’m preg-
nant” (Van Berkum et al., 2008). A statis-
tical account of such anomaly detection is
far from apparent.
The PDC account appears to assume
“autonomous transmission” in which pro-
duction and comprehension are indepen-
dent processes (Pickering and Garrod,
2004). However, autonomous transmis-
sion is difficult to reconcile with the flu-
ency of dialog, in which interlocutors
overlap their speech (thus producing and
comprehending at the same time) and reg-
ularly complete each other’s utterances. In
(1) below [from Gregoromichelaki et al.
(2011)] B begins to ask a question (1b),
but A’s interruption (1c) completes the
question and answers it.
1a—–A: I’m afraid I burnt the kitchen
ceiling
1b—–B: But have you
1c—–A: burned myself? Fortunately not.
The fluency of such joint contributions
suggests that comprehension and produc-
tion processes are directly linked in dia-
log. This is difficult to explain in an
autonomous transmission framework in
which A has first to comprehend the utter-
ance (1b) and then independently pro-
duce the continuation (1c) from scratch
(see Pickering and Garrod, in press).
However, we believe that the principles
of the PDC account are in fact compat-
ible with our proposal, in which pro-
duction and comprehension are tightly
interwoven.
We therefore applaud MacDonald’s
(2013) insistence on the relationship
between production and comprehension
(as well as distribution). But the impor-
tance of prediction-by-simulation and the
tight relationship between contributions
to dialog suggests that the relationship
between production and comprehension
is more direct than assumed by the PDC
account.
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